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Despite a substantial literature describing the memory benefit resulting from testing (i.e., 
memory retrieval), relatively few investigations have attempted to detail how retrieval acts as a 
memory modifier.  One core issue concerns the extent to which testing and studying effect 
fundamentally similar or different processes or components of memories.  The present paper 
introduces two computational models, both based in REM theory (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) 
and designed to provide a plausible basis for describing the testing effect at a more mechanistic 
level than existing theories.  The two models are derived from the same set of core assumptions 
about the functioning of the memory system, and differ only in their specifications of the 
components of memories that are modified as a result of retrieval.  The “Item Model” (IM) 
assumes that retrieval serves primarily to strengthen the target item content representation of 
information that is retrieved.  In contrast, the “Context Model” (CM) assumes that retrieval 
serves to embed additional contextual information into the target memory trace, facilitating the 
subsequent ability of the memory system to locate such items.  This manuscript provides 
coverage of relevant areas in the literature that have bearing on the IM and CM, details the 
implementation of the models and their larger framework, and reports on 4 experiments designed 
to test contrasting predictions of the IM and CM.  Experiment 1 observed a testing effect using a 
mixed list, but not a pure list design, implying that testing may serve to enhance the search 
process by strengthening context information in memory. Experiments 2-4 were designed to 
examine the effects of reinstating contextual information during final testing on the testing effect.  
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Experiments 2 and 3 found that reinstating either perceptual contextual elements (Exp. 2), or 
semantic context cues (Exp. 3) at the time of final test did not significantly impact the magnitude 
of the testing effect.  However, Experiment 4 found that reinstating the initial learning 
mental/temporal context at the time of final test mitigated the magnitude of the testing effect.  
Potential nuanced interactions between testing and context in memory are discussed. 
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 Retrieval acts as a potent memory modifier.  The act of remembering a past event can 
serve, in many cases, to strengthen one's retention of the remembered event such that it will be 
more likely recalled in the future.  This positive effect of retrieval on subsequent memory is 
referred to as the testing effect (see reviews from Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a, and Rowland, 
2014), research upon which has strongly intensified in the past decade (Rawson & Dunlosky, 
2011).  Although much is known about the circumstances under which testing is more or less 
beneficial to memory, less attention has been called to the question of how testing strengthens 
memory.   
 The notion of “strengthening” a memory (through testing or other means) is its self an 
ambiguous descriptor (Tulving & Bower, 1974).  Typically, an operation can be considered to 
strengthen a memory if it serves to increase the likelihood of accessing that memory at some 
point in the future.  However, there are a variety of ways in which a memory may be 
strengthened.  For example, a memory trace may receive additional content in its representation; 
more effective cues may be present to guide retrieval, or interference from other competing 
memories may be reduced, all of which serve to increase the likelihood of remembering.  
Furthermore, in the view of some frameworks, increasing the strength of one aspect of a memory 
may not immediately manifest in increased recall likelihood (e.g., see the distinction between 
storage and retrieval strength, Bjork & Bjork, 1992).  Existing work on the testing effect is 
largely agnostic as to how memory strengthening occurs, and what precisely is strengthened as a 




 Most examinations of the testing effect can be described as using a common experimental 
paradigm.  Participants begin by being exposed to a set of material that they are tasked with 
learning, such as a list of words or word pairs (e.g., Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Pyc & Rawson, 
2010; Rowland & DeLosh, 2014a; Rowland, Littrell-Baez, Sensenig, & DeLosh, 2014; Toppino 
& Cohen, 2009), essays or more complex prose passages (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b), or 
non-verbal stimuli such as maps or images (e.g., Kang, 2010; Rohrer, Taylor, & Sholar, 2010).  
Following this initial study phase, and typically a delay, participants are re-exposed to the 
material either by being granted a second study opportunity (i.e., a “restudy” condition), or are 
given an initial test over the materials (i.e., a “testing” condition).  Subsequently, after an 
additional delay (i.e., a retention interval), participants’ memory is assessed during a final test 
(i.e., a memory assessment).  Thus, empirically, the testing effect refers to the reliable finding 
that participants in the testing condition outperform participation in the restudy condition on the 
final memory assessment.  That is, testing “strengthens” memory, in some way.  
 Most of the theoretical accounts that have been advanced to describe the testing effect 
have been proposed at a broad level, lacking mechanistic specificity.  For instance, testing during 
learning has been proposed to induce a similarity in the type of processing during learning that is 
then subsequently utilized during a final memory test (see Bjork, 1988; Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006a).  Other accounts of the testing effect assume that the benefit to memory results from, or is 
related to, the more effortful or difficult processing that a retrieval task demands, when compared 
with a restudy task (e.g., Bjork, 1978; Jacoby, 1978; Pyc & Rawson, 2009).  Although such types 
of theories can serve as useful characterizations of the testing effect (see Rowland, 2014, for a 




work is that the proposed components driving the testing effect are characterized at only a broad, 
abstracted level.   
There have been only a limited number of theoretical accounts of the testing effect that 
attempt to describe the ways in which retrieval impacts memory at a fine-grained process or 
mechanistic level, and in most cases, such accounts assume that testing serves to alter the way 
that target items are themselves represented in memory.  One such account, the mediator 
effectiveness hypothesis (Carpenter, 2011; Pyc & Rawson, 2010; see also the more general 
elaborative retrieval hypothesis, Carpenter, 2009; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006), is rooted in the 
notion that retrieval exploits the semantic characteristics of information one is attempting to 
learn.  In particular, the mediator effectiveness hypothesis specifies that testing during learning 
can facilitate a learners’ ability to generate “mediating information,” defined as information (e.g., 
a word or concept) that forms a link between a cue and a target piece of information.  For 
example, given a cue-target pair of “CAT – BOWL,” an initial test during learning given the cue 
“CAT - ?” may prompt the learner to generate a mediator linking the cue and target together, 
such as “food.”  Later, at final test, given “CAT – ?,“ the learner may recall the mediator “food,” 
thereby increasing the likelihood of recalling the target “BOWL.”  In broad terms, the mediator 
effectiveness hypothesis and related “elaborative retrieval” accounts (e.g., Carpenter, 2009; 
Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Rawson, Vaughn, & Carpenter, 2014) assume that testing during 
learning exploits the semantic characteristics of material that is being learned, such that the 
content of memories is embellished, strengthened, or elaborated upon.       
A similar characterization of the testing effect that is also rooted in the utilization of 
semantic information comes from Verkoeijen, Bouwmeester, and Camp (2012; see also, 
Bouwmeester & Verkoeijen, 2011).  Their account assumes that retrieval serves to strengthen the 
4 
 
representation of semantic features in a memory trace, whereas restudy strengthens surface 
features (e.g., perceptual characteristics).  As such, when a final test is administered that allows 
for the exploitation of surface-level cues to guide retrieval, restudy may emerge as a more 
effective learning strategy.  In contrast, given conditions in which participants must utilize 
semantics to guide retrieval, a testing effect should emerge.   In a novel test of this theory, 
Verkoeijen et al. (2012) had bilingual participants (fluent in Dutch and English) learn 
semantically themed word lists in Dutch through study and either initial testing or restudying.  
After a brief delay, participants were given a recognition test over the stimuli in either Dutch (i.e., 
the same language as learning) or English (i.e., different language from learning).  Verkoeijen et 
al. (2012) observed a testing effect only for participants given a different language test, 
presumably because phonological and orthographic cues were no longer present in the 
recognition test stimuli (given that the words were presented in a different language).  Again, the 
theory assumes that testing exploits the content of items stored in memory: in this case, their 
semantic content.  
Theoretical characterizations that emphasize the role of semantics in the testing effect 
have drawn substantial attention and support.  In addition to the characterizations outlined above, 
additional findings from the literature have been advanced in the same vein.  For instance, testing 
may facilitate the semantic organization of information in memory (Congleton & Rajaram, 2011, 
2012; Zaromb & Roediger, 2010); promote false recall of information that is semantically related 
to learned material (McDermott, 2006, though cf. Nunes & Weinstein, 2012); and activate 
semantically related material that was learned during the same episode (e.g., Chan, McDermott, 




motivated research concerning the testing effect has, largely, been to assume a central role for 
semantics, or more generally, target item characteristics, in driving the testing effect.   
Despite the strengths of semantic-based accounts, one difficulty faced by 
characterizations of the testing effect that emphasize the exploitation of semantic item 
characteristics involves the emergence of testing effects in situations devoid of semantic content.  
Reliable testing effects emerge in studies where the material learned includes faces or names 
(e.g., Carpenter & DeLosh, 2005; Morris, Fritz, Jackson, Nichol, & Roberts, 2005; Sensenig, 
Littrell-Baez, & DeLosh, 2011), unfamiliar symbols e.g., (Kang, 2010), or spatial relationships 
(Carpenter & Kelley, 2012).  In such cases, there is not clear, inherent, semantic content 
embedded in the material to be learned, yet a testing effect reliably emerges in such cases, and is 
not substantially different in magnitude compared with circumstances in which materials 
allowing for semantic exploitation are utilized (Rowland, 2014).  As such, although testing may 
utilize semantic information embedded in learned material, it alone does not appear able to 
explain the emergence of the different types of testing effects observed in the literature. 
A recent theoretical framework, applied to the testing effect, provides further illustration 
of the emphasis of retrieval influencing item-level characteristics.   The bifurcation framework 
(Kornell, Bjork, & Garcia 2011; Halamish & Bjork, 2011) represents material to be learned in 
terms of tested and restudied item distributions across a continuum of memory strength.  The 
framework assumes that, during learning, all items represented by the restudy item distribution 
receive an increment to memory strength by virtue of re-presentation (i.e., the entire restudy 
distribution is positively translated on the memory strength continuum).  In contrast, the test item 
distribution becomes bifurcated (i.e., split) following the initial testing phase during learning.  
The proportion of the test item distribution that lies above an initial test strength threshold (i.e., 
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the items that are successfully remembered on the initial test) are granted a large increment to 
their memory strength, whereas the portion of the test item distribution below threshold (i.e., not 
successful recalled) receives no strengthening from the initial test.  Thus, the test item 
distribution becomes split into two, representing successfully, and unsuccessfully, retrieved 
items.  At final test, the items in either the test or restudy item distributions with memory 
strengths that fall above a final test threshold are successfully recalled, whereas items below the 
strength threshold necessary for final test recovery are not recalled.  The bifurcation framework 
thus characterizes item distributions in terms of their memory strength, and has been successful 
at explaining a number of interactions reported in the literature in a parsimonious way (see 
Halamish & Bjork, 2011; Kornell et al., 2011; Rowland, 2014; Rowland & DeLosh, 2014a).  
One strength of the framework lies in the fact that it assumes only that items themselves are 
strengthen by testing, to some degree beyond restudy, but otherwise are treated in a qualitatively 
similar way to restudy items.  As such, the bifurcation model serves as another characterization 
of the testing effect that assumes that retrieval serves to exploit, alter, or strengthen item 
characteristics (although it is neutral as to the specific contributing mechanisms).  Together, the 
theoretical characterizations described above share the commonality of assuming that testing 
impacts or exploits the content of items stored in memory. 
The Importance of Context 
Despite the emphasis in the existing testing effect literature that grants explanatory power 
of the effect to the exploitation of semantic or other item characteristics, there is evidence that 
the testing effect may emerge in part through enhancing the utility of episodic, contextual 
information that is linked to a target item.   Generally, context is seen as having a central, 
fundamental role in learning and memory.  The concept is rooted in the fact that learning and 
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memory does not occur in a void, but rather material is exposed- and memory is utilized- in a 
physical, mental, and temporal context.  Although a stringent, definitive explanation of what 
precisely entails “context” is lacking throughout the literature, it is typically viewed as at least 
encompassing elements that co-occur with the material that sits at the locus of attention.  Context, 
in this sense, may include environmental stimuli peripheral to the attended material (e.g., the 
physical location one is in during learning; see, e.g., Smith, 1979); internal mood states or 
thoughts (e.g., a participants’ stream of consciousness; see, e.g., Bower, 1972), and the given 
moment in time (i.e., temporal context, see, e.g., Howard & Kahana, 2002).    Thus, in all cases, 
context refers to elements that co-occur with to-be-learned items (i.e., items at the focus of 
attention).   Most modern episodic memory models assume that material is encoded into memory 
along with contextual elements that co-occur during learning, and that memories are retrieved by 
utilizing context as a potential cue to access past information, as will be elaborated upon when 
describing the models below.  Context, in this sense, plays a central role in the functioning of 
episodic memory.    
There is a variety of evidence that retrieval from episodic memory serves to influence our 
subsequent access to- and utilization of- context when probing memory. Initial testing seems to 
enhance the utility of recollection on subsequent memory decisions (Chan & McDermott, 2007).  
Recollection, in this context, refers to a memory process which allows one to remember details 
that co-occurred with the original encoding episode of a remembered item (e.g., context).  Across 
a series of experiments, Chan and McDermott (2007) found that initial testing increased the 
contribution of recollection (see Jacoby, 1991) in a subsequent recognition task (see also 
Verkoeijen, Tabbers, & Verhange, 2011); yielded a greater likelihood of participants self-
reporting that they remembered contextual details from the original study event; and enhanced 
8 
 
list-differentiation.  That is, initial testing facilitated the ability of participants to discriminate the 
original list context in which a given item was presented in, given a situation where stimuli were 
presented in multiple, separable, lists (see also Brewer, Marsh, Meeks, & Clark-Foos, 2010).  
Such findings suggest that testing may operate not solely through exploiting item-specific 
characteristics of tested information, but through altering the means and precision with which 
information is located in memory.  That is, retrieval may help one subsequently hone in on the 
context in which a memory was previously encoded, thus improving memory performance by 
recreating a past context, or narrowing the “search set” (see Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981): the 
set of potential contenders from which the memory system must discriminate between when 
searching for a target memory.     
Additional support for this possibility comes from studies that have examined the effects 
of retrieval on interference in memory.  Szpunar, McDermott, and Roediger (2008) developed a 
paradigm in which participants study a series of five lists.  One group of participants studies each 
of the five lists in succession, whereas a different group is given an initial test over each list 
immediately after it is presented.  After the five lists are presented, a final, criterial test is 
administered, in which participants are asked to recall only the items from list 5 (i.e., the final 
list).  Work using this design shows that initial tests protect against the build-up of proactive 
interference, such that very few intrusions from lists 1-4 emerge on the criterial list 5 test for 
participants in the testing condition, relative to the substantial intrusions that emerge for 
participants not given the initial tests (Szpunar et al., 2008; see also, Weinstein, McDermott, & 
Szpunar, 2011).  As such, testing appears to help participants discriminate between items that 




narrowing of the possible candidate items to recall given a constrained retrieval task (see also 
Potts & Shanks, 2012).   
The evidence reviewed above suggests that testing may serve to exploit item content (e.g., 
semantic) information in memory, or, may alter the way in which memories are able to be 
located in a given context.  The following section describes an overview of a model framework 
from which two similar models are derived: the “Item Model” (IM), which assumes that testing 
strengthens the representation of item content, and the “Context Model” (CM), which assumes 
that retrieval causes additional context information to be represented in memories.  The two 
models derive from the same framework, and thus are described together with the exception of 
their key differences that occur at the time of retrieval.  Following an overview of the models, 
four experiments are reported, designed to test competing predictions from the two model 
variants.  
Overview of the Model Framework 
 The testing effect model described below is based in REM theory (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 
1997), and derived more specifically from a variant of REM from Malmberg and Shiffrin (2005), 
which combined aspects of REM and SAM (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981) to support a basic 
free recall paradigm.  The model specifies that memories can exist in the form of 
lexical/semantic traces or as episodic traces.  Throughout the course of an experiment, items that 
are presented to a participant to be learned are stored as episodic traces which include both 
content information (i.e., information about the item itself, such as semantic or perceptual 
features) and context information (i.e., information about the contextual state in which the item is 
presented).  Content information for an episodic trace is stored as a lossy, error-prone copy of the 
lexical/semantic trace of an item being learned, whereas the context information in an episodic 
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trace draws from the current state of context a participant is in, which presumably changes 
gradually over time.   
 During initial study, new episodic traces are established in memory drawing from the 
process described above.  In a typical testing effect paradigm, items are again exposed during an 
intervening phase, either in the form of test trials or restudy trials.  In the case of test trials, the 
model assumes that a search and recovery process is attempted to recall the item being cued (or 
in the case of free recall, any item previously encoded).  Similarly, during restudy trials, an 
equivalent search and recovery process is engaged in (i.e., study phase retrieval occurs) with the 
item serving as a cue for its self.  When retrieval is successful (for either test or restudy trials), an 
item is strengthened by augmenting the content and context information stored in the recovered 
trace.  Importantly, the degree to which content (IM) or context (CM) information is 
strengthened is inversely proportional to the difficulty of recovery of the item, which in turn is 
dependent on the strength of the existing content stored in the episodic trace being recovered, 
along with the information present in the provided cue.  The IM and CM differ in their 
assumptions about whether content (IM) or context (CM) information is strengthened by testing 
to a greater degree than restudy.  Thus, restudy trials lead to little strengthening of episodic 
content or context information as such trials are performed with a very strong cue (i.e., the item 
its self), whereas test trials receive a more sizable increment to episodic content (IM) or context 
(CM) information as the cue used during a test trial- if present at all- is not a complete copy of 
the item being retrieved.  In addition to the strengthening of episodic content or context 
information following successful retrieval, episodic images receive a baseline shot of additional 
content (CM) or context (IM) information (the latter following from Malmberg & Shiffrin, 2005), 
the size of which is not dependent on cue strength.  In sum, successfully retrieved test and 
11 
 
restudy items both receive similar sized baseline increments to content (CM) or context (IM) 
information (i.e., a single "shot"), but test items receive a larger increment to content (IM) or 
context (CM) information than restudied items, the degree of which is inversely proportional to 
the strength of the retrieval cue and the existing episodic image content.   
 Time is modeled as passing by a gradually drifting state of temporal context.  As such, 
experimental delays (e.g., a retention interval) can be simulated by altering the current state of 
context (as represented by a vector of feature values) to a degree corresponding to the length of 
delay, or the magnitude of context change.  Given that current context is utilized during retrieval, 
such context drift is able to alter recall performance as described in detail below. 
Detailed Implementation of the Model 
 Initial study. Lexical/semantic images (i.e., the generic, stored representations of stimuli 
used in an experiment) are represented as vectors of features (holding w features, set to 20 for the 
present simulations) drawn from a geometric distribution with base rate g = .45.  As such, 
lexical/semantic images contain feature values ranging from [1 - infinity), with higher values as 
increasingly rare, presumably representing more unique or distinct features of a given item.  
Similarly, current context is represented as a vector (size w) drawn from the same distribution.  
During initial study, episodic images are laid down item-by-item as error prone, incomplete 
copies of lexical/semantic images with associated context information.  Following from 
Malmberg and Shiffrin (2005), the likelihood of storing a given feature increases with the 
number of storage attempts, t, such that a feature will be stored (i.e., a non-zero value stored in 
the episodic trace vector) with probability 1 - ( 1 - u)
t
.  When storage of a feature occurs, there is 
a probability, c, that the value stored will be accurate (i.e., the same as drawn from the 
lexical/semantic image or the current context), otherwise a random value is drawn from a 
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geometric distribution.  As such, episodic images are both lossy (i.e., storage is not always 
successful), and error-prone (storage is not always correct). 
 The amount of time an item is studied dictates the amount of features stored in an 
episodic trace in a negatively accelerated fashion.  That is, the number of storage attempts, t, at 
storing a piece of content information into an episodic trace can be described as tj =  tj-1(1 + e
-aj
) 
where a is a scaling parameter to adjust the rate of storage, t1 is the number of storage attempts in 
the first one second of study, and j represents the study time in seconds.  Context information is 
stored in a similar manner, with the exception that the amount of context that can be stored is 
capped, assuming that after two seconds, no additional information is stored (i.e., regardless of 
study time, the number of context storage attempts is capped at t2,).  The above described rules 
for content and context storage are entirely derived from Malmberg and Shiffrin (2005) and 
maintained for consistency; however they have little bearing on the issues under investigation in 
the present manuscript. 
 Free recall. The model implements two forms of retrieval: free recall and cued recall 
(the latter used for both cued recall test trials and for restudy trials).  The two methods are largely 
similar, and thus free recall will be described first, with the additional assumptions then outlined 
for cued recall.  During free recall, a cue-dependent search of all stored episodic traces in is 
carried out through a two-step sampling and recovery process.  The search process described is 
based on a simplified version of that used in SAM (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), using only 
the current state of context as a cue.  The current context is utilized as a search probe, and 
matched to the context features of all episodic traces, with a likelihood ratio assigned to each 
image based on the relative match between the cue (current context) and the stored image 
context.  Likelihood values are calculated such that matches in features between the cue and 
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image increase likelihood, whereas mismatches decrease likelihood, with greater feature values 
weighted more heavily:   
   (   )
   ∏(
  (   )  (    )
   
  (    )
   )
    
,        (1) 
where gs represents a base rate for the occurrence of feature values, i is a context feature value (1 
to infinity), nij is the number of mismatching feature values in the episodic image, Ij, and nijm is 
the number of matches of feature i with value j.   A specific image, I, is then selected 
probabilistically given the relative match between the cue (Q) and the image versus the match of 
the cue to all other images in memory: 





 ,          (2) 
where y is a scaling parameter. 
 Once an image has been sampled, recovery is then attempted.  Whereas the probability of 
sampling an item depends on the relative match between cue and an image, the probability of 
recovery depends on the absolute strength of the stored episodic image information.  The 
probability of recovery is specified as: 
 ( )   (  
    
 )              (3) 
where pc is the proportion of matching content features between the sampled episodic image and 
the target lexical/semantic image,  px is the proportion of matching context features between the 
sampled episodic image and the current context, and b and t are scaling parameters.  Thus, the 
likelihood of recovery of an item depends on both the absolute match between stored content 
features to the target, and stored context features to the current context.  Note that this recovery 
method differs from the typical implementation of recovery in similar models (e.g., Malmberg & 
Shiffrin, 2005; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981) in that the degree of context match is taken into 
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account (in the other models mentioned, recovery is based only on the strength of content 
information without regard to stored context information).  The inclusion of context match 
during recovery is necessary to account for increasingly low levels of recall following variable 
(and often, long) retention intervals as are commonly used in the testing effect literature.  
Although a larger context mismatch will hurt the likelihood of sampling a specific item, this 
decrease rapidly asymptotes, given that even under circumstances of completely mismatching 
learning and test contexts, the likelihood of sampling a given item with a context cue equals 1/n, 
where n is the number of episodic images in memory, as sampling is dependent on the relative 
match between cue and images.
1
  Including context match during recovery allows performance 
to drop to near floor following exceedingly long retention intervals given that recovery depends 
on the product of image vs. target content match and encoding vs. current context match.  
Conceptually, this characteristic of the model can be thought of as a participant needing to recall 
a specific item that was studied, along with the fact that it was encoded in the experimental 
context.  
 When free recall is initiated, participants engage in a repeating series of sampling and 
recovery attempts.  First, an image is sampled.  If the sampled item has not previously been 
output during the free recall procedure, recovery is attempted.  If successful, the recovered item 
is output, incremented (as described below) and a new item is sampled (with replacement of the 
                                               
1 Mensink & Raaijmakers (1984) implemented a contextual drift mechanism into the SAM framework, including 
a means to uniformly reduce the likelihood of sampling any image by adding a positive, constant value to the 
denominator of the sampling equation.  However, given that in testing effect paradigms there are always at least 
two sources of delay (between initial study and test(s), and initial test(s) and final test), typically of different 
durations, and that items may or may not have been exposed at various periods in an experiment (e.g., 
unsuccessfully tested items are not re-exposed whereas retrieved items are), such a mechanism of lowering 
sampling likelihood globally by a single constant was not used.  Instead, in the present model, the effect of delay 
on recall manifests through the lower context match during both sampling and recovery following a delay. 
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previously recovered image) following the same procedure.  If a previously output image is 
again sampled, or if recovery is unsuccessful, a recall failure occurs and a new item is sampled.  
Free recall terminates when Kmax failures accumulate.      
 Cued recall. The above sampling and recovery procedure is also used during cued recall 
trials with a few exceptions.  First, a cue is constructed as a lossy version of the lexical/semantic 
image of the target (i.e., a fragment of a given item serves as its own cue.  That is, each feature of 
the target image is copied into a new vector with a probability defined by a parameter governing 
cue strength, q, otherwise no feature is stored.  Sampling is conducted by calculating the relative 
match between the context cue and the context information stored in each episodic image, as 
done during free recall, in addition to the match between the item cue and episodic content 
information: 
 (      )  
   
 







 ,         (4) 
where L refers to the likelihood as derived from equation 3 between the item cue, C, and episodic 
image content (subscript "c" likelihoods), or the current context cue, Q, and the episodic image 
context (subscript "x" likelihoods).  Recovery is then attempted after an image, I, is sampled.  
The model assumes that all information available is used during recovery (i.e., the item content 
stored in the episodic image, in addition to the item content information provided by the cue its 
self).  Thus the cue (which is a lossy copy of the target lexical/semantic image) is merged with 
the sampled episodic image content into a new "combined" vector, and recovery is then 
attempted following equation 3 using the combined vector to calculate content feature      
matches (pc).   
 On a cued recall trial, the sampling and recovery process repeats in the same manner as 
during free recall, with the exception that a recovered item is only output if it is correct (this 
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simplifying assumption was made for purposes of the present investigation, though a more 
complete model should account for cued recall output errors).  The cued recall sampling and 
recovery process repeats until the target is successfully recovered and output, or Cmax failures 
accumulate, where a failure occurs when an incorrect image is sampled or recovery fails.            
 Restudy.  The model assumes that study phase retrieval occurs during re-presentations of 
any items during a simulation.  The procedure mimics that of cued recall, with the key contrast 
being that the item re-presented serves as a cue for its own episodic image.  That is, during cued 
recall cue construction as described above, the cue constructed during restudy is simply a copy of 
the lexical/semantic image studied with perfect fidelity (i.e., q = 1.0), and the sampling and 
recovery cycle proceed as in a cued recall trial.  However, if study phase retrieval fails, a new 
episodic image is encoded as in the same manner as described during initial study, with the 
exception that context and content features are both encoded with a low fidelity (probability of 
storing a feature equals u*t), though note that the specifics of this component of the model are of 
little consequence to the present issues. 
 Incrementing.  The key component of the model as it applies to the testing effect 
concerns, of course, the consequences of retrieval.  However, two variations of the model are 
instantiated by altering the behavior of the model during incrementing: the IM (in which 
incrementing primarily impacts item content), and the CM (in which item context is emphasized).  
The IM is described first.  Following successful recovery of a target (during free recall, cued 
recall, or study phase retrieval), the recovered episodic image is modified.  First, a baseline 
"shot" of context is supplied to the recovered episodic image context vector (i.e., missing 
features are added) in the same manner as during initial study (though already stored features are 
not overwritten).  In addition, missing features are added to the recovered episodic image content 
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vector in the same manner as during initial study, but with probability: 
  (  (   )  )(    
 ) ,       (5) 
where m is a scaling parameter, and pc, as in equation 3, refers to the proportion of features that 
match between the target lexical/semantic image vector and the combined episodic image 
content vector and item cue that was used during recovery.  Thus, the stronger the combined 
episodic image plus item cue (or in the case of free recall, the episodic image content alone, as 
no item cue is provided) matches the target, the lower the likelihood of storing a new feature in 
the episodic image.  Note that if the episodic image or combined episodic image and item cue 
perfectly match the lexical/semantic target image (i.e., pc = 1.0) in which case the probability of 
storing a feature reduces to 0, the match value is reduced (to 0.99 in the present simulations) to 
allow some degree of incrementing to occur under such circumstances.    
 The CM behaves in a similar way to the IM model (described above), with the exception 
that the effects on item content and context are flipped.  Item content is granted a baseline shot of 
information.  Recovery of an item re-instates stored context information from the item into the 
current context (see, e.g., Howard & Kahana, 2002), with each element having probability r of 
updating.  Importantly, following successful retrieval in the CM, item context is modified 
according to equation 5, such that the amount of item context strengthening is an inverse 
function of the degree of match between the retrieval cue(s) and item content.  In other words, 
more difficult retrievals (i.e., weaker cues) yield larger increments to item context.   
 Context change. Delays in the model are implemented by randomly generating a 
new value for each feature in the current context vector with probability D (i.e., context 
randomly drifts), presumably with longer delays leading to more contextual drift, and thus, larger 
D.  Multiple, variable delays occur in testing effect paradigms, but for present purposes, the 
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contextual drift for simulating delay was only applied at the time of the retention interval, as 
described by the parameter DRI.  Contextual drift can also be useful for simulating other 
experimental tasks which, presumably, cause a shift in one's internal context state (e.g., distractor 
tasks, sources of interference, or list changes).   
Overview of the Proposed Experiments 
Four experiments were conducted to assess differing predictions of the IM and CM. 
Experiment 1 elaborated on work by Rowland et al. (2014), which examined the list-strength 
effect (Ratcliffe, Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990; see also Tulving & Hastie, 1972) as it relates to the 
testing effect.  The IM and CM share differing predictions about the emergence of a list-strength 
effect in testing paradigms, given that the impacts of testing in the CM are primarily on the 
sampling process, whereas retrieval in the IM primarily impacts recovery.  Past work in the area 
has suffered from non-perfect initial test performance, thereby making the results difficult to 
interpret given that retrieval success varied in test condition items.   By boosting initial test 
performance to near ceiling, a more reliable assessment of the impacts of testing on item content 
versus context can be assessed.   
Whereas Experiment 1 was designed to assess a key difference in the way in which 
testing impacts the sampling or recovery processes during recall, Experiments 2-4 examined the 
extent to which available contextual information is exploited at final test.  In each Experiment, 
contextual information linked to the material learned in the initial study phase was either 
reinstated or not reinstated at the time of final test.  Experiment 2 manipulated the reinstatement 
of an element of perception context (background color) from initial study.  Experiment 3 
manipulated semantic context cues, such that information was processed in relation to a weakly 
semantically related cue during learning, and cues were either reinstated or not reinstated at time 
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of final test.  Experiment 4 reinstated mental, temporal, context via an imagination task 
(following Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002), in which participations in a reinstatement condition were 
tasked with mentally recreating their thoughts in the moments preceding and leading into the 
initial study phase of the experiment.  In the case of each experiment, the CM predicts that, 
during initial testing, contextual information from the initial study phase will be reactivated and 
stored within the item context image.  In contrast, the IM model specifies that initial testing of an 
item will not lead to extra contextual information from the initial study phase to be stored into 
the item context representation.  As such, the models differ in the extent to which context 
information from the learning episode is represented in the episodic images of tested items, and 
thus the extent to which that contextual information can be subsequently exploited to drive final 
recall.  The IM model predicts that contextual information should not impact the magnitude of 
the testing effect, whereas the CM assumes a more effective exploitation of context cues, and 
thus a larger testing effect when such context is reinstated.  Parameters used in the models to 
predict the general patterns of results examined in the experiments for the CM and IM are 
reported in Table 1.        
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Table 1.  Parameter values used in the simulations 
Parameter Value Description 
w 20 (M&S) Size of all vectors (lexical/semantic, episodic 
content, episodic context, current context) 
g 0.45 (M&S) Parameter used to sample a geometric distribution 
when generating feature values 
gs 0.40 (M&S) Parameter used in sampling likelihood ratio 
calculations 
u 0.06 Probability of successfully storing a feature, per attempt. 
t1 6 (M&S) Number of storage attempts during first second of 
study. 
a 1 (M&S) Scaling parameter for feature storage 
c 0.95 Probability of accurately copying a stored feature 
y 0.15 Scaling parameter for sampling likelihoods 
t 2.2 Scaling parameter for recovery  
b 26 Scaling parameter for recovery 
m 10 Scaling parameter for incrementing 
q 0.85 
 




Probability of drifting each current context feature at the 
retention interval 
Kmax 30 Number of errors at which free recall terminates 
Cmax 16 Number of errors at which cued recall terminates 
Note. (M&S) specifies the value used is that from Malmberg and Shiffrin (2005), many of which 








One method to examine the way in which information is represented in memory is to 
examine the extent to which changes to some items impact the ability to recall other items.  In 
the context of the model, and the larger REM framework (see Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997), there 
are two stages that are encountered during the task of recall: sampling and recovery.  The 
sampling phase represents the process of locating a specific item in memory amongst other items, 
given a set of cues.  More generally, sampling reflects the process of honing in and determining a 
specific item to retrieve from memory.  Critically, the likelihood of a given item being sampled 
is a function of the relative match between available cues and the memory image.  Manipulations 
that increase the match between a cue and target in memory will have the consequence of 
weakening the likelihood of sampling other, non-target items.  In other words, increasing the 
match between a cue and a specific target also serves to decrease the match between that cue and 
other targets.   As such, manipulations that impact the ability of the memory system to locate a 
given item will have an impact of making other, non-target items, less likely to be sampled.  In 
recall tasks, context serves as a primary cue to guide the memory search.  As such, items in 
memory that have a greater contextual match with the context cues used to guide retrieval will be 
more likely to be sampled, at the expense of other items that lack robust contextual information.           
Once an item has been sampled (i.e., selected from amongst other items), the recovery 
phase refers to the task of unpacking the item for recall.  Unlike sampling, recovery depends not 
on the relative match between current and stored context, but rather on the item content its self 




manipulations that impact item content, rather than context, will serve primarily to facilitate 
recovery, rather than sampling, in recall tasks.   
The distinction between sampling and recovery has been particularly influential in 
memory modeling, as it allows for such models to account for list-strength effects, among other 
empirical observations (e.g., output interference, part-set cuing).  The list-strength effect refers to 
the finding that certain types of manipulations that strengthen a subset of learned items also lead 
to a weakening of the remaining, non-strengthened subset of learned items (Ratcliffe et al., 1990).  
For example, in the case of the spacing effect when learning mixed lists consisting of both 
spaced and massed items, spacing serves to enhance recall of those items, but at the cost of 
weakening recall of massed items (Malmberg & Shiffrin, 2005).  When spaced and massed items 
are learned separately (e.g., by using a between-participant manipulation), the magnitude of the 
effect tends to reduce.  Recent work has observed a lack of a list strength effect in the testing 
effect (Rowland et al., 2014), with similar magnitude testing effects observed in both pure list 
(i.e., between-participant) and mixed list (i.e., within-participant, where lists consist of 
intermixed test and restudy items) designs.  However, one problem with existing work concerns 
the lack of uniform treatment to test condition items.  As elucidated by the bifurcation 
framework (Halamish & Bjork, 2011; Kornell et al., 2011), testing effect paradigms typically 
yield two classes of test condition items: those that are retrieved (and accrue whatever benefits 
that come from retrieval), and those that are not retrieved (and presumably are not strengthened 
or impacted as a result).  Initial test data from Rowland et al. (2014) showed that participants 
successfully recalled approximately 75% of test items, yielding 25% of the test items unretrieved.  
When interpreting the results from the study, it is unclear whether the testing effect in fact does 
not yield a list-strength effect, or if testing yields either a positive or negative list strength effect 
23 
 
that is then mitigated by the 25% of items that received differential treatment (i.e., unsuccessful 
initial retrieval) in the test condition.  In fact, there is reason to suspect at least a possible masked 
list-strength effect from the Rowland et al. (2014) data, given that all restudy items were granted 
a spaced presentation (and thus received additional context; see Malmberg & Shiffrin, 2005), 
whereas only 75% of tested items had the opportunity for additional context to be stored 
following successful retrieval.  One possibility is that test trials yielded a greater storage of 
context than restudy trials, but the difference in magnitude was counterbalanced by the smaller 
proportion of test items that received the extra context storage (75%), versus the 100% of restudy 
items.  However, given the bifurcated test condition data, such a possibility is only speculative.   
The IM and CM produce differing predictions about the list-strength effect that can only 
be reliably assessed under conditions in which nearly all test condition items receive the same 
treatment of successful retrieval.  The IM model presumes that testing effects operate primarily 
through enhancing item content after retrieval, thereby making test condition items more likely 
to be recovered, but not impacting the sampling process.  As such, the IM predicts a null list-
strength effect, and instead a main effect of testing, given that in all conditions tested items 
enhance their absolute likelihood of retrieval (via impacting the recovery process).  In contrast, 
the CM predicts a positive list-strength effect, such that testing serves to supplement item context 
information and thereby yield a greater likelihood of sampling tested items over restudied items.  
That is, the CM predicts that the impacts of testing will influence the sampling process, and thus 
make the tested items relatively more available to be located in memory, at the expense of less 





paradigm with a minimal bifurcation of test items, by adopting an initial test procedure that 
yielded high initial test performance.
2
               
Method 
Participants 
One hundred participants were solicited using Amazon Mechanical Turk, drawing from a 
broad, online sample.  Seven participants failed to complete the task (i.e., responses were not 
provided, or were off topic), and thus data were collected from 93 participants.  There is recent 
work showing that online samples perform in a similar manner to traditional undergraduate 
participant pool samples, in a variety of tasks (e.g., Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), 
including memory tasks similar in design to the proposed study (e.g., Rowland, Bates, & DeLosh, 
2014). A power analysis indicated a required sample size of 90 in order to attain .8 power, 
assuming a testing effect size of d = .66 (based on the estimate from Rowland, 2014).  
Approximately 65% of participants identified as female, and ages ranged from 22 to 62.      
Design and Materials 
The experiment utilized a design following the method detailed by Erlebacher (1977), 
which is useful for examining list-strength effects.  Participants were divided into three 
conditions: pure test; pure restudy; and mixed.  Using three groups, Erlebacher’s design allows 
for the examination of two factors: the manipulation of test versus restudy, and the nature of the 
manipulation (i.e., between vs. within participants).   Stimuli to be learned consisted of sixteen 
unrelated nouns drawn from Wilson’s (1988) MRC Psycholinguistic Database, constrained to 1-
                                               
2 An alternative method to reduce bifurcation of test condition items is to provide feedback after each test trial (see 
Kornell et al., 2011; Rowland & DeLosh, 2014a), thus re-exposing testing condition items that are not successfully 
retrieved.  This method was not employed, however, under the assumption that unsuccessful test trials followed by 
feedback would seem unlikely to reinstate prior context, if context reinstatement is indeed a mechanism contributing 
to the testing effect. 
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2 syllables, 6-8 letters, word frequency between 10 and 25 occurrences per million, and 
concreteness and imagability values between 300 and 500.   
Procedure 
Participants began by being presented with instructions of the task, including an 
indication that a list of words would be presented and should be remembered for a later memory 
assessment.  First, during the initial study phase, 16 items were presented, sequentially, for 4 s 
each.  Following the initial study phase, participants completed a 15 s mental math task, 
requiring them to complete a series of simple arithmetic operations and input their answer.  After 
the short distractor task, participants were re-exposed to the stimuli, in a format depending on 
their condition.  Those participants in the pure restudy condition saw all 16 items, sequentially in 
a new random order, for 7 s each, and were instructed to copy each item as shown by typing it 
into a provided text box.  Participants in the pure test condition received fragments of the 
previously learned stimuli in a new random order, for 7 s each, and were instructed to recall and 
input the previously studied item that completed each fragment.  Fragments were constructed in 
such a way that only 2 letters were removed from each item in order to promote a high level of 
initial test performance (e.g., “CA_CHE_” for the item “CATCHER”).  Note that Rowland and 
DeLosh (2014a) used a similar paradigm and cuing procedure and were successful in yielding 
near-ceiling initial test performance.  Participants in the mixed condition received 8 trials of test 
items and 8 trials of restudy items, randomly intermixed, and in the same format as the 
corresponding trials in the pure test and pure restudy conditions, respectively.   
Following the intervening test or restudy phase, participants completed a 4 min distractor 




was then administered, in which participants were instructed to recall as many items as possible 
from the entire experiment.  In total, the experiment lasted approximately 12 min.   
Results and Discussion 
Data are reported in Figure 1.  No differences were found on initial test performance 
between the mixed (85%) and pure (83%) test groups, t(30) = .71, p = 48. Final test data were 
submitted to Erlebachers’ (1977) ANOVA model, in which the effects of testing versus restudy, 
and of mixed versus pure lists, can be examined.  A main effect of intervening task emerged, 
with tested items recalled at a higher frequency than restudied items, F(1,89) = 4.75, p < .05, ηp
2
 
= .14.  The main effect of list type was not significant, F(1, 64) = 0.02, p > .10, ηp
2
 = 0.  A trend 
towards an interaction between intervening task and list type was observed, F(1, 89) = 3.77, p 
= .06, ηp
2
 = .11 with the pattern of results indicating a list strength effect, such that a testing 
effect emerged in the mixed list condition, t(30) = 3.93, p < .01, d = .69, but not the pure list 
condition, t < 1, d = .04.   
 

























The results of Experiment 1 are compatible with the prediction of the CM model, which 
assumes that testing strengthens the representation of context stored in the memory trace.  If the 
strong trend towards an interaction (p = .06) is interpreted as significant, a list-strength effect 
emerged, with a testing effect obtaining in the mixed- but not pure-list condition.  This result is 
at odds with Rowland et al. (2014), who did not observe an interaction between list type and the 
testing effect.  However, in addition to different levels of initial test performance, one key 
difference between the reported experiment and those of Rowland et al. (2014) involves the use 
of a single list in the present experiment versus a series of lists (i.e., interpolated study-test 
learning phases across multiple lists) in the past research.  Although it is not clear what the 
precise influence of a single vs. multiple list design on the testing effect is, it is possible that any 
effects of testing that influence the storage, or recovery of context (e.g., see Howard & Kahana, 
2002), may interact with the presentation of segregated lists.  For example, multiple list designs 
may yield less interference in a pure test versus pure study condition if testing serves to recover 
and contextually segregate the separate lists.  Similarly, compared with the previous work, 
participants in the present study were exposed to a smaller number of stimuli (16, versus 36 total 
items in Rowland et al.), and thus if testing serves to restrict the search set used at final test, it 
may serve to be more beneficial to memory under circumstances where a larger set of stimuli are 
learned, regardless of the type of list employed.  Even so, such possibilities are speculative and 
may warrant further investigation.  For present purposes, the key implication of the present 
results is that they suggest that testing may serve to strengthen the representation of context in a 
memory trace, as inferred by the observation of a list-strength effect (see Malmberg & Shiffrin, 








 Experiment 1 investigated whether testing primarily influences the memory systems’ 
ability to search for an item in the sampling process (as influenced primarily by context 
information), or to unpack an item after it has been located in the recovery process (as influenced 
primarily by content information).  In contrast, Experiment 2 (in addition to Experiments 3 and 4) 
is designed to examine whether context information can be effectively utilized during final recall 
to help locate information previously learned via testing.  This issue was examined by presenting 
information to be learned in the presence of unique contextual cues during initial study.  At a 
final free recall test, context cues associated with the initial study phase are either re-presented or 
absent.  The CM assumes that, during initial retrieval, contextual elements from initial study are 
re-instantiated and subsequently strengthened within the successfully retrieved test item episodic 
images.  As such, the explicit re-instatement of those contextual elements at the time of final test 
is predicted to facilitate the sampling and subsequent recall of test items.  As such, the CM 
predicts that context cues at final test should increase the magnitude of the testing effect.  In 
contrast, the IM assumes that testing enhances item content, not context.  Thus, the explicit 
reinstatement of contextual cues at final test should similarly (rather than differentially) influence 
the sampling of test and restudy items, and as such the testing effect is predicted to be of similar 
magnitude with or without final test context cues provided.  In Experiment 2, the method of 
manipulating context (specifically, perceptual context) cues was adapted from Isarida and Isarida 
(2007), in which material is studied in the context of either of two different background colors.  




contextual cues available at test (i.e., the same color as during initial study, or a different color 
from initial study). 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-five participants were solicited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Five participants 
were dropped for failing to provide valid responses, yielding a useable sample size of 40.  A 
power analysis indicated a required sample size of 34, given effect size f = .25, and .8 power.  
Effect sized estimates were derived from assuming a medium effect, similar to that observed by 
Isarida and Isarida (2008), from which the context manipulation was adapted.  Approximately 
sixty percent of participants identified as female, and ages ranged from 19 – 53.  
Design and Materials 
 The experiment employed a 2x2 within-participant design, manipulating intervening task 
(test versus restudy) and final test cue reinstatement (same versus different).  A stimulus set of 
16 unrelated nouns was generated using Wilson’s (1988) database, following the same 
constraints as used in Experiment 1, with the exception of increasing the word frequency range 
to 25 – 75 occurrences per million. 
Procedure 
 Participants began by entering an initial study phase in which the 16 words were 
presented, sequentially, for 4 s each. Each word was presented against either a blue or red 
background color.  The order of item presentation (and thus the background colors) was random, 
with the constraint that each background color was presented an equal number of times, and no 
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more than two consecutive trials passed in which the same background color was presented.
3
  
Following initial study, a 15 s mental math distractor was administered, after which participants 
completed the intervening task phase of the experiment.  The same method used in the mixed list 
condition of Experiment 1 was employed (i.e., 7 s per item, with test and restudy trials randomly 
intermixed, user responses solicited and typed in, and test items cued with fragments missing 2 
letters), and with the constraint that equal numbers of both the test and restudy items were 
associated with each the two background colors from the initial study phase.  Thus, 8 items were 
tested and 8 restudied.  The trials during the intervening task were presented against a neutral 
(white) background color. 
 Following a 3 min distractor task, a final free recall test was administered for 90 s.  
During the final test, participants received a context reinstatement of one of the background 
colors exposed during initial study (i.e., blue or red).  In sum, an equal number of items belonged 
to each of four crossed conditions: tested same context (e.g., studied with a blue background, 
tested, and with a final test blue background); tested different context; restudied same context; 
and restudied different context.                 
Results and Discussion 
 Data are presented in Figure 2.  Initial test performance between the same (84%) and 
different (79%) reinstatement conditions did not significantly differ, t(39) = 1.48, p = .15.  Final 
test data were submitted to a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA, with intervening task (test versus 
restudy) and cue reinstatement (same versus different) as factors.  The main effect of intervening 
task was significant, with tested items recalled at a higher frequency than restudied items, F(1, 
39) = 17.47, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .31.  However, neither the main effect of cue reinstatement,  
                                               
3 Isarida and Isarida (2007) found that randomly intermixing colors yields more robust context effects than blocking 
items by background color.   
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F(1, 39) = .027, p = .87, ηp
2
 = 0, nor the interaction, F(1, 39) = 1.01, p = .32, ηp
2
 = .03, reached 
significance.   
 
Figure 2.  Experiment 2 Final Test Performance. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 Although the results of Experiment 1 suggested that testing likely impacts context 
memory, Experiment 2 did not find statistically significant support for the CM model, suggesting 
that context reinstatement, at least at the perceptual, item-specific level, does not largely 
influence the testing effect.  Note, however, that the numerical trends were in support of the 
predictions of the CM.  That is, there was a .19 mean difference between tested and restudied 
items in the same context reinstatement condition (d = .54), whereas the difference was only .12 
in the different context condition (d = .4).  Even so, this pattern was not statistically significant.  
In contrast, the results are consistent with the IM model, which assumes that testing serves to  
strengthen item content, and thus should enhance memory similarly with regard to the presence 



























 Experiment 2 examined the effect of a specific type of context reinstatement: perceptual.  
An additional form of context concerns the conceptual, or semantic, context in which a given 
piece of information is processed.  A method that can be used to examine this type of context 
involves manipulating the types of cues that are presented.  For example, cuing the target “chair” 
with “table,” leads to processing the target in a different semantic context when compared with 
the cue “committee.”  Thus, a semantic cue can serve as a contextual element peripheral to the 
target.  Experiment 3 thus adapted a method, derived from Thomson and Tulving (1970), in 
which participants were exposed to target items paired with weakly associated contextual cues.  
Following a test or restudy opportunity, a final cued recall test was administered with items cued 
either in the presence or absence of the weakly associated contextual cue. 
 Such a manipulation fits within the domain of the encoding specificity principle (see also, 
Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977).  In brief, memory is often the most accurate when the 
conditions at retrieval match the conditions at encoding (though cf., Nairne, 2002).  As such, 
reinstating a semantic cue to guide retrieval of a given target at the time of final test can be 
considered to be reinstating a form of context that relates to the conceptual nature of the episodic 
event, rather than a perceptual element.  A primary purpose of Experiment 2 is thus to examine 
the possibility that the relationship between testing and context may be selective as to the 
specific type of context under consideration. 
 Similar to Experiment 2, the CM predicts that context reinstatement should increase the 
magnitude of the testing effect.  As such, an interaction between the effects of testing and context 
is predicted to emerge, with a larger magnitude testing advantage in the context reinstatement 
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condition.  In contrast, the IM assumes that context reinstatement should have no preferential 
effect on tested or restudied information, and thus the model predicts a main effect of testing, but 
without an interaction.  Thus, the key difference in predictions between the two models concerns 
the presence (CM) or absence (IM) of an interaction between testing and context reinstatement.                       
Method 
Participants 
 Fifty-five participants were solicited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, with 8 participants 
failing to complete the task, thus yielding data from 47 participants.    A power analysis indicated 
a required sample size of 34, based on the parameters employed for Experiment 2.  Given that 
the models do not differentiate between specific types of context, the same effect size to that 
used in the Experiment 2 power analysis was estimated.  Reported females made up 
approximately 70% of the sample, and ages ranged from 20 – 67.      
Design and Materials 
 Two factors were manipulated within-participants: intervening task (test versus restudy), 
and cue reinstatement (reinstated versus not reinstated).  Sixteen nouns, serving as targets, were 
generated from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Wilson, 1988), constrained to 5-7 letters, 1-
2 syllables, a frequency range of 100 – 225 occurrences per million, and concreteness and 
imagability values of 500-700.  Word frequency, concreteness, and imagability were increased 
from the parameters used in Experiments 1 and 2 in order to ensure that participants would be 
able to more easily interpret the target in the context of an associated cue.  Each of the cues were 
weakly associated to the targets (forward associative strength = .01), and derived from the USF 





 Participants were instructed that they would be exposed to word pairs, with a target 
presented in upper case, and a cue in lower case.  They were instructed to learn the target words 
by thinking about how they relate to the cue words.  During initial study, each word pair was 
presented for 5 s, sequentially, in the form “cue – TARGET.”  After the 16 initial study trials, a 
15 s distractor ensued, followed by the intervening task.  A random half of the items were tested, 
with the other half restudied, in a randomly intermixed order, in the same format as Experiments 
1 and 2 (i.e., the target was presented either in full or missing 2 letters).  A 3 min distractor task 
followed the initial study phase, and subsequently, a final cued recall test was administered.  
During the final test, participants were presented, sequentially, with the first two letters of each 
of the 16 targets serving as cues (e.g., “TA_____”, for the target TABLE).  In addition, a random 
half of the target cues were accompanied by the weak associate context cue (e.g., “wood – 
TA____”).  Participants had 10 s to attempt retrieval before moving to the next item.    The 
experiment lasted approximately 12 minutes.      
Results and Discussion 
 Data are presented in Figure 3.  Performance on the initial test did not differ between 
reinstated (78%) versus non-reinstated (81%) items, t(46) = .60, p = .55. Final test performance 
was examined using a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA.  Main effects of intervening task, F(1,46) 
= 8.93, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .16, and cue reinstatement, F(1,46) = 10.42, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .19 were 
significant, with tested items recalled at a higher frequency than restudied items, and reinstated 
cues leading to better performance than non-reinstated cues.  No interaction was observed 
between the two factors, F(1,46) = .07, p = .80, ηp
2





Figure 3.  Experiment 3 Final Test Performance.  Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Similar to Experiment 2, testing was beneficial for memory overall, though there was no 
influence of cue reinstatement on the magnitude of the testing effect.  As such, the testing effect 
does not appear to be reliably influenced by reinstating either perceptual or conceptual context 




























 Whereas Experiments 2 and 3 examined the effect of perceptual and semantic context 
reinstatement on the testing effect, Experiment 4 was designed to assess mental, temporal 
context reinstatement.  To accomplish this goal, a mental imagination and reinstatement task was 
adapted from Sahakyan and Kelley (2002).  Using this method, a context change can be induced 
by invoking a mental state in participants that differs drastically from their current experimental 
task.  For instance, Sahakyan and Kelley had participants mentally walk through and describe 
their parents’ home, or describe what they would do given the ability to be invisible.  Later, 
context can be reinstated by having participants explicitly recount the thoughts and feelings they 
had near the beginning of the experiment.  As such, using an imagination task allows a different 
type of context to be reinstated when compared with the perceptual and conceptual elements of 
Experiments 2 and 3; namely, mental, or temporal context. 
 An additional deviation of Experiment 4 from Experiments 2 and 3 concerns the breadth 
of association between the context cue and target items.  In Experiments 2 and 3, the reinstated 
context cue varied rapidly, trial to trial (i.e., background colors were randomly intermixed, and 
semantic cues were unique to each target).  However, the mental context reinstated in 
Experiment 4 was stable during learning, and common to all the stimuli learned by the 
participant.  That is, all of the targets were associated with the same list context.  The importance 
of this distinction is elaborated upon in the General Discussion.    
 As in Experiments 2 and 3, the key finding of interest concerning the models is the 
presence or absence of an interaction between testing and context reinstatement.  The CM 
predicts an interaction, such that the testing effect should be larger under conditions of context 
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reinstatement.  In contrast, the IM predicts no influence of context reinstatement on the 
magnitude of the testing effect, and as such, predicts that only a main effect of testing should 
emerge.   
Method 
Participants 
 Eighty-two participants were solicited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Ten participants 
failed to follow task instructions, yielding data from 72 participants.  A power analysis indicated 
a target sample size of 68 participants (power = .8; f = .25), again, based on the assumption of a 
similar effect size given that the models do not differentiate between types of context. 
Approximately 60% of participants identified as female, and ages ranged from 19 – 64.   
Design and Materials 
 Experiment 4 employed a 2x2 mixed design, with intervening task (testing vs. restudy) 
manipulated within-participants, and context reinstatement (reinstated vs. not reinstated) 
manipulated between participants.  36 participants were assigned to the reinstatement condition, 
and 35 to the non-reinstatement condition.  Sixteen stimuli were generated using the same 
parameters as Experiment 2.   
Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 2 in most aspects.  During initial study, 
each of the 16 items was sequentially presented for 4 s each.  After a 15 s math distractor task, a 
randomly intermixed 8 items were given a restudy opportunity, and the remaining 8 items were 
initially tested, with 7 s per trial.  After the intervening task, all participants received an 




The task was derived from Sahakyan and Kelley (2002, Exp. 2): participants were given 
90 s to mentally “walk through” and describe the layout of their parents’ home.  Descriptions 
were solicited via a text box.  Next, those participants in the no-reinstatement group were given a 
90 s distractor (generating and reporting animal species), whereas participants in the 
reinstatement group were given a 90 s experimental context reinstatement imagination task.  The 
task, also derived from Sahakyan and Kelley (2002, Exp. 2), requested participants to recall and 
imagine the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that they experienced immediately preceding the 
experiment, and furthermore, to consider any thoughts, feelings, or emotions that arose as the 
experiment began.  Descriptions were solicited via a text box.    
All participants were next given a 90 s free recall period, in which they were asked to 
recall as many of the originally studied items as possible.  The experiment lasted approximately 
12 minutes.        
Results and Discussion 
 Data are presented in Figure 4.  Participants did not differ in initial test performance 
between the reinstatement (83%) and no-reinstatement (79%) groups, t(69) = .74, p = .46.  Final 
recall data were submitted to a 2x2 mixed factor ANOVA.  A main effect of intervening task was 
detected, with tested items recalled at a higher frequency than restudied items, F(1, 69) = 21.68, 
p < .01, ηp
2
 = .24.  The main effect of context reinstatement was not significant, F(1, 69) = .05, p 
= .83, ηp
2
 = 0.  However, an interaction between the two factors was significant, F(1, 69) = 4.30, 
p = .04, ηp
2
 = .06 with a larger testing advantage observed in the non-reinstatement compared 
with the reinstatement condition.  Post-hoc means comparisons showed that a significant testing 




whereas in the reinstatement condition, the testing effect did not reach significance, t(35) = 1.87, 
p = .07, d = .32.  
 
Figure 4.  Experiment 4 Final Test Performance.  Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 Experiment 4 differed from Experiments 2 and 3 by demonstrating an influence of the 
reinstatement of a contextual element on the testing effect.  However, in contrast to the 
prediction of the CM, the testing effect was in fact larger in the non-reinstatement condition, 
indicating that testing may be more beneficial when in the absence, rather than presence, of 




























 The testing effect was examined across a series of four experiments designed to test 
competing predictions of models that rest on differing assumptions about how retrieval alters 
memory.  The IM assumes that the act of testing serves to strengthen the item content stored in a 
memory trace, thus leading tested material to be more easily recovered after it is located in the 
memory search process.  In contrast, the CM assumes that retrieval enhances the storage of 
contextual elements in memory.  In particular, retrieval is assumed to cause a reinstatement of 
prior context, which is then updated into the memory trace along with the current state of context 
during the retrieval trial.  As such, the CM specifies that testing serves to alter the ability of the 
memory system to sample a specific item amongst the other items in memory.  By adding 
additional diagnostic information to the memory trace, the CM specifies that testing makes 
retrieval more likely in large part by increasing the utility of context cues when sampling 
possible candidates for retrieval (see Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981).  In short, the CM model 
assumes that testing helps one locate an item in memory, whereas the IM model assumes that 
testing helps strengthen an items’ content directly.       
 Results from the experiments lend mixed, equivocal support to the models.  Experiment 1 
revealed a list-strength effect, with a testing effect emerging in mixed- but not pure- lists, 
consistent with a prediction of the CM.  More specifically, when tested and restudied items are 
intermixed in the memory system, initial testing appears to lead to a greater selective sampling of 
tested items during a final free recall test.  Because sampling operates according to the relative 
match between cues available at test (i.e., the current state of context, in the case of free recall) 
and information stored in memory, a list strength effect indicates a greater degree of context 
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match between the final free recall context cue and the contextual information stored in tested 
memory traces (see also Malmberg & Shiffrin, 2005).  Thus, although Experiment 1 indicates 
that testing likely interacts with context memory in some way, it does not elucidate the specific 
nature of the interaction.  Experiments 2-4 serve as a way to examine the relationship between 
testing and context in more detail.     
  Experiments 2 and 3 did not observe statistically significant effects of context 
reinstatement on the testing effect, consistent with the IM.  That is, reinstating background color 
(Exp. 2) did not alter the testing effect, nor did reinstating semantic cues (Exp. 3).  However, of 
particular note, Experiment 4 revealed an influence of context reinstatement on the testing effect, 
though in contrast to the predictions of the CM, explicit context reinstatement in fact mitigated, 
rather than enhanced, the magnitude of the testing effect.  As such, differences in the nature of 
the context that was reinstated in Experiment 4, compared with Experiments 2 and 3, are of 
particular interest.     
 Context, as described in the Introduction, can refer to a wide variety of elements.  In the 
present study, the contextual elements examined include perceptual, semantic/conceptual, and 
mental/temporal features, and thus are themselves qualitatively different from each other.  One 
salient distinction between types of contextual features, as described by Glenberg (1979), 
concerns whether a given element of context varies rapidly, trial-by-trial (i.e., “local” context), or 
stays relatively stable across trials (i.e., “global” context).  Experiments 2 and 3 both 
manipulated the reinstatement of local contexts: in Experiment 2, background color randomly 
changed, trial by trial, during learning, and was item specific. In Experiment 3, semantic cues 
were unique to each target.  In contrast, the reinstated context in Experiment 4 was global and 
common to all items: the internal, mental and temporal context associated with the entire 
42 
 
learning phase of the experiment.  This distinction might serve as a useful way by which to 
consider the discrepant results across Experiments 2-4.  Specifically, two issues are discussed: 
the observation that testing seems to interact with manipulations of global contexts, but not local 
contexts, and secondly, the nature of that interaction, whereby the testing effect is larger in the 
absence, rather than presence of explicitly reinstated contextual cues.   
 Little existing work has examined the relationship between testing and local contextual 
elements, and even then, there is not any clear consistency.  Rowland (2011) observed a 
statistically significant, albeit small, effect of testing on enhancing later memory for perceptual 
elements of local context (i.e., font color of item presentation).  However, Brewer et al. (2010) 
failed to find an influence of testing on memory for varied acoustic information present at 
learning (the gender of a speaker reading stimuli).  In contrast to local context, most work that is 
directly relevant to the relationship between testing and context has concerned contexts that are 
both shared by many items and are relatively slow to change.  As described in the Introduction, 
testing has been found to enhance list-discrimination (e.g., Chan & McDermott, 2007), such that 
participants are better able to discern which- of multiple- lists a given item belongs to.  As such, 
one possibility is that the contextual information updated in memory following retrieval largely 
consists of slowly changing and global contextual information.  Indeed, this type of gradually 
drifting context (e.g., temporal context) is often emphasized in models of memory, including the 
Temporal Ratio Model (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007), the Temporal Context Model (Howard 
& Kahana, 2002), and similar models such as the Context Maintenance and Retrieval Model 
(Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 2009).  Relatively less attention has been drawn towards elements of 




 In terms of developing the present models, future work may seek to examine the effects 
of different types of context, and their representations, within the models, with the distinction 
between local and global contexts acting as an initial step.  Indeed, the discrepant results of 
Experiments 2 and 3, compared with Experiment 4, indicate that the effect of explicitly 
reinstating context depends on the nature of the context being reinstated.  The model framework 
used in the present study, however, treats context as an undifferentiated construct, and in the 
present implementation, contextual elements may drift gradually (e.g., time), or rapidly (e.g., 
trial-to-trial background colors).  One possibility is to view context as solely temporal, or as the 
gradually drifting mental state.  In this view, elements of “context” that change rapidly and are 
linked to items themselves (e.g., background color, semantic cues), may better be represented as 
item content, rather than context information.  Benjamin (2010) argues that elements peripheral 
to the focus of attention in a memory task are not represented as “context,” but rather as content 
(the same as target information), though with a lower resolution.  One possible modification of 
the IM and CM could be to represent item content in such a way that all elements that change 
rapidly, trial by trial (i.e., local contexts), are represented, and with “context” reserved only for 
the gradual passage of time or mental state.  This construction of the models may provide a 
means by which to interpret the observed results of the experiments.  That is, no effects of 
context reinstatement on the testing effect were observed in Experiments 2 and 3, perhaps 
because context (i.e., global, temporal, mental context) was in fact not manipulated.  However, 
Experiment 4 did observe an interaction, perhaps because it provided the only true manipulation 
of global context in the study.  Such possibilities may be useful to explore further.   
 Given the emphasis of global contexts in memory modeling, the relationship between 
global context reinstatement and the testing effect may prove easier to reconcile within a 
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memory modeling framework.  The CM model assumed that context reinstatement would be 
exploited by tested items, and thus increase the magnitude of the testing effect.  However, global 
context reinstatement may be redundant, rather than particularly exploitable, with the inherent 
effects of testing.  This view is compatible with work from Szpunar et al. (2008), who found that 
testing, more so than restudy, helps one hone in on a specific subset of learned information (e.g., 
a specific list) in the absence of strong, explicitly provided context cues.  That is, the act of 
testing, on its own, serves a function similar to that of explicit context reinstatement.  Similarly, 
Rowland and DeLosh (2014b) found that testing a subset of items on a list can, under some 
circumstances, facilitate memory for other items from the same list context.  In particular, 
Rowland and DeLosh claimed that testing may help reinstate prior list contexts, facilitating 
access to all of the information learned within such contexts.  As such, although there have not 
been unequivocal, a priori predictions inferable from past work about the relationship between 
testing and context reinstatement, existing research is at least consistent with the possibility that 
testing inherently serves a function of reinstating contexts, and thus may be redundant with- 
rather than able to exploit- any explicit, experimenter-provided presented contextual cues.      
 An alternative but not mutually-exclusive possibility to explain the discrepant results 
across experiments is to assume that testing emphasizes the storage of only specific subtypes of 
context in memory.  That is, testing may selectively enhance and utilize mental/temporal 
contextual information, while influencing other types of context (e.g., perceptual) to a smaller 
degree, if at all.  Indeed, Brewer et al. (2010) found that, although testing enhanced list 
discrimination (see also, Chan & McDermott, 2007; Verkoeijen et al., 2011), it did not enhance 
memory for different aspects of context memory.  In particular, in one experiment, Brewer et al. 
(2010) had participants learn stimuli by listening to items presented in either a male or female 
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voice.  Testing was not found to strengthen memory for the voice in which an item was     
learned in.   
 Indeed, the models introduced in the present study do not explicitly identify or 
discriminate between different types of features stored as item context.  This ambiguity of the 
models is common to most work in the larger REM framework (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997), 
along with most other memory models that characterize memories as vectors of feature values 
(e.g., Hintzman, 1988; Howard & Kahana, 2002).  In fact, little work has been done to even 
explicitly describe the nature of “features” stored in memory traces.  Underwood (1969) outlined 
a taxonomy of possible types of information that are likely represented by features in memory 
traces (e.g., attributes concerning temporal, spatial, orthographic, and a variety of other 
characteristics about encoded events).  However, there lacks any application of such fine grained 
distinctions of feature types into modern memory models, nor is there any clear indication of 
what aspect of a given feature classification is tapped by a feature value in a vector (e.g., if a 
feature value is assumed to represent an orthographic feature of the stimulus, what is the 
particular orthographic feature being represented?).  That is, it is not clear what specifically 
about semantic content, or temporal context, is represented by a given feature value.  As such, 
there exists an explanatory gap between our assumptions about elements of events in memory 
and their representations in models.  Future work may benefit by adding more specificity to such 
representations.          
Conclusions 
Support for the models was mixed.  The IM derived support from Experiments 2 and 3, 
but not 1 or 4.  Experiment 1 was consistent with the CM.  The outcome of Experiment 4 was not 
predicted by either the CM or the IM, though the pattern of results does suggest that testing 
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interacts, in some form, with context.  Taken together, the reported experiments provide mixed 
evidence as to the types of strengthening in memory that result from retrieval.  The list-strength 
effect observed in Experiment 1 is consistent with the assumption that testing alters the search 
process in memory, likely by strengthening the representation of context in some form.  
Experiments 2-4, considered as a whole, suggest that testing may operate in part by helping 
implicitly reinstate global context features or mental/temporal features, to a greater degree than 
other, local contextual information.  Thus, a tentative conclusion from the present study is that 
testing likely strengths item content in memory to some extent, in addition to facilitating the 
search process by implicitly reinstating certain context cues during recall.  That is, testing likely 
recovers context on its own.       
 More generally, a contribution of the present work is to help elucidate the possible 
mechanisms through which testing strengthens memory.  Despite an inconsistent pattern of 
results across experiments, it does seem clear that testing, in some fashion, operates at least in 
part by interacting with context.  As such, future characterizations of the testing effect may 
benefit by considering the joint impact of item content strengthening, in conjunction with context 
strengthening and recovery. However, the specific nature of that interaction, and the types of 
context involved, remain areas of interest for further theoretical examinations of the testing effect.   
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